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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MONTE RAY HIGLEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18970 
GERALDINE WRIGHT HIGLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by Plaintiff-
Respondent, Monte Ray Higley, against Defendant-Appellant, 
Geraldine Wright Higley. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Weber County, the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist presiding sitting without a jury, granted a 
Decree of Divorce to each party against the other, and provided 
that the Decree of Divorce should not become final until the 
expiration of three months from and after the date of entry 
thereof. 
Wife (Defendant-Appellant) was granted the use and 
occupancy of the f:imi l; l1ome i11 Hcic•fH'C. 1·1 .!11 ! , ,, .. 1 ]'er, ,,,1 
three months unlil the divorce becomes fin.!l, cl11ririµ wl11ci 1 
time husband (Plaintiff-Respondent) is to nuke the mortP,d''.c 
payment thereon, together with the utility pavments on 
lights, and water and during the same period, he is to make 
available to wife his health and medical insurance. Durini\ 
the same three-month period, husband is also to pay to wife 
the sum of $150. 00 per month as temporary alimony pursuant to 
a temporary order signed by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on 
June 13, 1982 (R. 14). Although this temporary alimony aware 
was inadvertently omitted from the Decree of Divorce, it was 
set forth in the trial judge's bench ruling (R. 212). 
When the Decree becomes final at the end of the 
three-month waiting period, husband is ordered to continue tc 
make the house payme'.'lts for an additional three years, which 
payments shall be considered temporary alimony to wife. At 
the end of the said three years, wife is to receive $100.00 
per month permanent alimo'.'ly and the home in Hooper is to be 
sold at that time. The costs of sale are first to be paid 
and from the remaining proceeds, wife is to receive the firs: 
$6,000.00 and the remainder is to be divided equally between 
the parties. 
Husband is also awarded all of the tools. the '.JC I!· 
equipment, supplies, arid contents of the welding shop. the 
scrap and other metal; axles; a'.'ld other material and supplico 
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, , I al ed to the welding business. He is also awarded one of 
t lie sewing machi:"1es, the 1968 Ford pickup truck and camper, 
the leather tools and equipment, the movie camera, projector, 
screen, one-half of the movies, and his personal things. 
Wife is awarded all of the household furniture and 
effects, except for four items of husband's choice. Wife also 
receives the 1967 Ford, the 1971 Dodge Colt, the 1946 GMC 
pickup truck, and her personal effects. 
Defendant's civil service retirement accrued during 
the marriage is to be divided equally between the parties at 
the time it is received, pursuant to the formula set forth in 
the Utah Supreme Court case of Woodward v. Woodward cited at 
656 P.2d 431. 
Husband is to pay the marital debts of approximately 
$2,000.00, together with $500.00 toward wife's attorney's fees 
to be paid at a minimum of $25.00 per month. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Husband (Respondent) seeks an affirmation of the 
trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts contains numerous 
'"rrors and makes no citations to the pages of the record 
supporting the alleged statements as required by Rule 75(b) 
(2)(2) (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Husband alleges that the facts dre as follows 
The parties were married to each other on June• 1953 ril 
Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 12) Husband is and wife is 4: 
(T. 11 & 14). He did not complete high school and she is a 
high school graduate (T. 11 & 14). Five children have been 
born of the marriage, all of whom are adults (T. 12). The 
two younger children are ages 21 and 19 and still live with 
their mother, but contrary to wife's brief, both of these 
children are employed full time, are self-supporting, and are 
not attending college (T. 13, 54, 100). 
Husband has been employed as a welder at Hill Air 
Force Base since May, 1966 (T. 48). His net take-home pay is 
$1,159.68 in a four-week month (T. 49 & 50 and R. 24). His 
annual gross income at Hill Air Force Base is $24,356.80 (T. c 
Over the years, husband has operated a small welding business 
after hours and has earned additional money to help his childr; 
through college (T. 62). Husband testified that he will 
probably not maintain two jobs in the future (T. 62) and wife 
testified that he told her recently that he was unhappy. tirec 
overworked, and just needed a rest (T. 107). 
The statement which appears several places in wife'' 
brief that husband earns approximately $35,000.00 per year is 
not true. He has done no welding on the side since April, 
1982 (T. 62) and there is no testimony in the record that 
earns $10,000.00 a year on his second job. The only testimo1 
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'Jven was that in the last two or three years he has earned 
11•'Und $9,000.00 from his second job (T. 116). This amounts 
l<> between $3,000.00 to $4,500.00 per year, but will not 
continue in the future. 
Wife has considerable work experience, including 
being a sales clerk at J. C. Penney's, working at a phone 
answering service, operating scales for a sugar beet company, 
driving truck for local farmers, and being an Avon Sales 
Representative for approximately 10 years (T. 14 & 15). She 
has also taken in sewing, ironing, and done baby-sitting 
(T. 117). She also types and has done this for the business 
(T. 117) and she has also kept books for the business (T. 134). 
Wife underwent stomach surgery in 1972 (T. 118) and 
again in 1975 (T. 119), and had a hysterectomy somewhere 
between 1972 and 1975 (T. 120). She has not been hospitalized 
since that time except that she was in the hospital overnight 
as the result of a minor automobile accident a year ago (T. 17). 
Wife claims she was advised in 1979 that she would 
need another stomach operation (T. 159). She has never had 
the recommended surgery (T. 159). In response to her counsel's 
leading question, wife testified that she is on a liquid diet 
(T 121) but then testified that she eats potatoes, gravy, 
and sometimes beef (T. 121 & 152). She also stated that 
,iJt' needs one deep freeze for her meat and one for her vege-
Lab le s (T. 151). She stated she has no health problems 
other than her stomach condition (T. 124). Since her surger 
she has been physically active and has played baseball, 
softball, rides bicycles and horses, and raises a large 
garden each summer (T. 18) . The tr ia 1 judge found that she 
is an employable person and that most people with her health 
problems work (R. 214). 
The assets of the parties at the time of the trial 
consisted of the following: 
(a) A home in Hooper, Utah, situated on 
less than one acre of land (T. 24) on which 
there is also an old, small uninhabitable 
house and a building which husband has used 
as a welding shop (T. 25 & 26). Husband's 
estimate of the value of said real estate is 
$69,500.00, which is based on an appraisal 
made of the property (T. 27 and R. 27). There 
is a mortgage on said property of $7,300.00 
(T. 29), leaving an equity based on husband's 
valuation of $62,200.00, with mortgage payments 
of $205.00 per month. Wife originally listed the 
real property on her schedule of assets at a value 
of $69,500.00 (R. 29) but thereafter testified 
that she felt it was worth less than that, prob-
ably $50,000.00 to $55,000.00 (T. 128). She did 
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not have the property appraised. 
(b) Household furniture and furnish-
ings, including major appliances consisting 
of three refrigerators, three deep freezes, 
four television sets, a microwave oven, a 
washer, dryer, and four sewing machines 
(T. 153, 30, & 31). Husband estimates the 
value of the furnishings at approximately 
$5,000.00 (T. 31) and wife estimates their 
value at $600.00 (T. 153). 
(c) A 1967 Ford, a 1971 Dodge Colt, and 
a 1946 GMC pickup truck. Husband estimates 
the value of the Ford to be $400.00, the Colt 
$500.00 and the GMC pickup truck $100.00 
(T. 31 & 32). Wife estimates the value of 
the 1967 Ford at $200.00 (T. 150) and the Colt 
at $100.00 (R. 29). 
(d) A 1968 Ford pickup truck which hus-
band estimates to be worth $800.00 (T. 32) and 
wife claims its value is $2,500 (R. 29). 
(e) A 1971 Camper which both parties 
value at $500.00 (T. 38 and 133). 
(f) Welding equipment and tools which 
husband acquired with money he earned working 
evenings after getting off his job at Hill Field 
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(T. 33). He had an appraisal of the welding equip· 
ment from Whitmore Oxygen Company of $3, 155 00 
(R 19 & 20 and T. 6) and he has additional 
miscellaneous welding items which were not 
appraised which he values at about $500.00 
(T. 33). He also has hand and power tools 
which he values at $200.00 (T. 35). Wife 
estimates the value of the welding equipment 
and tools at $39,216.00 (T. 134 & R. 29). 
Wife has not had the welding equipment or 
tools appraised and states that her estimate 
is based upon what she thinks it would cost 
to replace the equipment (T. 156). 
(g) Lawn and garden tools, including 
rototiller and riding lawn mower which hus-
band values at $775.00 (T. 35 & 36 and R. 21). 
(h) Husband has firearms which he 
values at $400.00 (T. 37 and R. 21). 
(i) Scrap metal which husband values at 
$500.00 (T. 38 and R. 21). 
(j) Horseshoeing equipment which 
husband values at $100.00 (T. 38). 
(k) Wife claims husband is building 
a fifth-wheel utility trailer with a value 
of $3,500.00 (T. 133). Husband testified 
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this was built for his brother (T. 73) and 
the trial court made no disposition of it 
in the divorce decree. 
(1) Husband has accrued civil service 
retirement benefits at Hill Air Force Base in 
the sum of approximately $16,000.00 (T. 40 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). 
(m) At the time of their separation, the 
parties had a 1972 Suzuki motorcycle but it was 
stolen during the pendency of the divorce (T. 173). 
Husband claimed mental cruelty as grounds for divorce 
(T. 19), testifying that wife discriminated between his family 
and her's (T. that she discouraged their children from 
being involved with his family and attempted to turn them 
against husband (T. 19 & 21); that she was domineering, bossy, 
and had to have everything her way; that her maiden name was 
Wright and she told her husband she was Wright, and was born 
Wright, and would always be Wright (right), meaning she was 
never wrong (T. 20); that she frequently refused to have a 
sexual relationship with her husband, sometimes claiming 
that she was sick, although she was well enough to do other 
things, including getting her hair done, or going to town, 
or taking a trip (T 22); that she physically abused him by 
him and tearing the shirt off his back, although he 
did not strike her (T. 23 & 24). After losing his affection 
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for his wife, he developed an interest in another woman 
(T. 23) with whom he openly associated, even in the pres-
ence of his children (T. 98). Wife spent much of the trial 
testifying of husband's association with "the other woman". 
Wife told husband she did not intend to work and 
that he would have to support her the rest of his life 
(T. 19 & 158), but thereafter testified that she recognized 
that it would be necessary for her to be employed (T. 158). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EACH PARTY TREATED THE OTHER CRUELLY AND THE COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A DECREE OF DIVORCE TO EACH. 
Husband does not dispute the court's decision that 
wife is entitled to a decree of divorce because of his 
romantic activities with another woman. There is, however, 
ample evidence in the record to establish that the wife is 
not faultless in this marriage and that she has been guilty 
of cruel treatment, giving husband grounds for divorce. In 
addition to her misconduct testified to by husband and set 
forth above in the facts, the court correctly found that 
the wife's entire life centered around the children and that 
when decisions had to be made, wife always sided with the 
children and against husband (R. 210). Her preference for 
the children over her husband was made very clear at the 
trial when she testified that many of the husband's personal 
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1/iings should go to the children, rather than to him. This 
1 '" l l!ded his tools (T. 136), his guns (T. 137), the camper 
1T 155), his movie equipment (T. 162), his leather working 
tools (T. 163), and his welding equipment (T. 164). 
Although the court stated that the cause of the 
divorce was the wife's reaction to the discovery of husband's 
clandestine activity, the court did not find that this was 
the grounds for the divorce (R. 211). The court in a 
lengthy and well reasoned bench ruling explained his viewpoint 
and observation of the marital problems and concluded that 
the wife could probably have saved the marriage had she 
reacted differently to the discovery of her husband's romantic 
activities, and had there been early marriage counseling 
(See Bench Ruling R. 209-212). 
Respondent husband submits that the evidence 
establishes that wife is at least equally, if not more, at 
fault in this marriage. Should the court decide, however, 
that the cruelty of husband has been greater than that of 
wife, this does not preclude the granting of a decree of 
divorce to each party. Appellant's argument that the case 
of Mullins v. Mullins, 26 U 2d 82, 485 P2d 663, requires 
that the court must find each party equally at fault in order 
to grant a decree of divorce to each is not true. In that 
the court stated 
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"There seems to be nothing in our stat1J!e 
or in logic Lhar would prevent ci dissolt1lit>n 
of the marriage by granting a divorc·p tt> both. 
where the facts fault each equallv 3S re>spect 
to grounds therefor. -- if such procedure would 
make anybody happy." 
This language is merely permissive and indicates 
that the court grant a decree to each party if their 
fault is equal, but does not require that the fault be 
equal in order to grant a decree to each. The court goes on 
to state: 
"Whether one or the other or both should be 
given a divorce should be left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court based on the 
evidence adduced." 
In most cases, there is misconduct on the part of 
both parties, but in very few, if any, is the misconduct of 
each party exactly equal. To require such a finding would 
preclude the granting of a divorce decree to each party in 
substantially every case. The recognition of this concept 
is set forth in the Utah case of Hendricks v. Hendricks, 
123 U 178, 257 P2d 366, wherein the court stated: 
"To affirm that a guilty spouse is never en-
titled to a divorce is a position difficult to 
to apply to the facts of life. It is seldom, 
perhaps never, that any wholly innocent party 
seeks a divorce against one who is wholly guilty. 
Awareness of this fact and the giving of atten-
tion to the social implications of divorce has 
given rise to various exceptions and limitations 
on the doctrine of recrimination." 
The language of the Hendricks case quoted by 
Appellant to the effect that "the trial court would best 
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r tr1rm its function in the administration of justice by 
1 r· Le rmining which party was least at fault, granting a 
1ivorce, and adjusting their rights" is not mandatory and 
still clearly leaves the discretion to the trial court. 
The appropriate concept is recognized by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Mackey v. Mackey, 
420 P2d 516, wherein the Court stated: 
"l. Our statute, 12 0.S.1961, Sec. 1275, 
providing that where the parties appear to 
be in equal wrong, a divorce shall be granted 
to both parties, is no proscription against 
granting a divorce to both parties where both 
ask for a divorce and the evidence shows both 
are at fault, although one was more in the 
wrong than the other." 
See also Izatt v. Izatt, Utah 627 P2d 49 (1981). 
In the Utah case of McKean v. McKean, 544 P2d 1238 
(1975), the court granted a decree of divorce to each of the 
parties, and on appeal, the wife claimed that the divorce 
should have been awarded to her alone. The trial court made 
no findings that the parties were equally at fault and the 
Supreme Court stated: 
"We have carefully reviewed the record in this 
case and conclude that the record supports the 
court's finding that each of the parties were 
entitled to a divorce." 
POINT II 
: llE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DIVIDING THE 
ASSETS OF THE PARTIES OR IN ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY TO APPELLANT. 
Respondent has a difficult time determing what is 
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meant by Appellant's QUESTION OF L\\.C ,\ppc·lld11L quotes 
paragraph from the case of Gramme v. llL:!li, )() / \'.'<I ! 
(1979) regarding the criteria in determining a reasonable 
award for support and maintenance, but does not indicate whcr 
in she feels the trial court was in error. It is not known 
whether she objects to the division of assets ordered by the 
court, or merely to the alimony award. 
In the case of Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 
431 P2d 802 (1967) this court stated: 
"In reviewing the trial court's order in divorce 
proceedings there are certain well established 
principles to be borne in mind. The findings 
and order are endowed with a presumption of val-
idity, and the burden is upon the appellant to 
show they are in error. Even though our consti-
tutional provision, Section 9 of Article VIII, 
states that in equity cases this court may review 
the facts, we nevertheless take into account the 
advantaged positition of the trial judge. Accord-
ingly, we recognize that it is his prerogative to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and in 
case of conflict, we assume that the trial court 
believed the evidence which supports the findings. 
We review the whole evidence in the light most 
favorable to them; and we will not disturb them 
merely because this court might have viewed the 
matter differently, but only if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings." 
The wife has not borne the burden of overcoming the 
presumption of validity of the court's finding and order. On 
the basis of values established by husband's testimony, the 
wife was awarded property worth approximately $40,100.00, con 
sisting of the home $34,100.00, furniture $5,000.00, 1967 Focl 
$400.00, 1971 Dodge Colt $500.00, 1946 GMC pickup truck $100 
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11,,,,hcrnd was awarded property worth approximately $34,150.00, 
. '",is ting of equity in the home $28, 100. 00, 1968 Ford pickup 
truck $800.00, welding equipment $3,550.00, hand and power 
tools $200.00, firearms $400.00, camper $500.00, miscellaneous 
scrap metal $500.00, and horseshoe equipment $100.00. 
The significant differences in estimated values of 
assets consist of the tools and equipment, the 1968 Ford pickup 
truck, and the household furniture. The husband's estimate 
of the value of the welding equipment and tools is based pri-
marily upon an appraisal made by an experienced and competent 
welding equipment appraiser and dealer. The wife's inflated 
estimate of $39,216.00 was based on her personal opinion 
of the replacement cost of the equipment, notwithstanding 
that she has had no experience as a welder. 
Her estimate that the value of the 1968 Ford pickup 
truck is $2,500.00 is also grossly inflated when it is 
recognized that this truck is 15 years old and she estimated 
its value to be more than 12 times greater than the value she 
placed on their one year older 1967 Ford automobile. 
Her estimate of the value of the household furniture 
at $600.00 is unrealistically low when it is recognized that 
the appliances alone include three refrigerators, three deep 
freezes, four television sets, a microwave oven, a washer, 
<irl'er, and four sewing machines. 
The fact that the family home is to be sold in three 
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years and the wife to receive $6,000.00 more of the proceed' 
than does the husband, is not inequitable to the wife It 
should be remembered that the children of the parties are all 
raised and this is by far the most substantial asset of the 
parties. The only fair way the parties can share in the 
assets is for the home to be sold and the court treated the 
wife more than fair in delaying the sale for three years. In 
most divorce easer, the husband is entitled to his equity in 
the home at the time the youngest child reaches majority. 
The court dealt equitably with the wife regarding the 
civil service retirement benefits, holding in substance that 
she should receive one-half of those benefits which accrued 
during the marriage pursuant to the formula set forth in the 
recent case of Woodward v. Woodward. 
The award of alimony to wife is fair and equitable. 
For three months after the trial date, she is to receive 
approximately $695.00 per month, consisting of $150.00 per 
month temporary alimony, $205.00 per month house payment, and 
utility payments which she testified total $340.00 per month 
(R. 7). For the next three years, she is to receive alimony 
in the form of her house payment of $205.00 per month, and 
thereafter she receives $100.00 per month permanently. This 
is more than fair to the wife in view of the husband's net 
monthly income of $1,159.68 (R. 24) and his own monthly 
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11ic; expenses of $933.00 per month, including $273.00 per 
1•1llnth payments on debts totalling $2,000.00 (R. 24 & 25). 
The trial court took into consideration the need 
the wife claims to additional stomach surgery when he ordered 
that the decree of divorce should not become final for three 
months to enable the wife to take advantage of husband's group 
medical insurance coverage through his employment, and the 
granting of $695.00 per month financial assistance to her for 
those three months. Although the wife claims she was diagnosed 
as needing this surgery four years ago, she has apparently 
never been sufficiently ill to require that she obtain the 
surgery. To the date of this brief, she has still not had the 
surgery. Notwithstanding her testimony that she is on a 
liquid diet. she stated that she eats potatoes, gravy, soup, 
and sometimes meat, and that she has need for at least two 
deep freezes in which to store her meat and vegetables (T. 
151). Her physical activities of playing softball, baseball, 
bicycling, riding horses, coaching, unloading blocks, and 
gardening, all raise question as to the validity of her 
alleged health problems. The trial court was correct in 
finding that she is an employable person and that most 
people with this kind of health condition are able to work. 
recognizes this and testified that she has been seeking 
emplovment (T. 158). 
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With wife's past work experience, she shuulrl be 
able to obtain employment and upon sale of the family home 
in three years, she will have a substantial sum with which 
to remake her life. 
The trial court met well its responsibility set 
forth in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U 2d 79, 296 P2d 977 (1956), 
wherein it is stated: 
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of their 
ecomonic resources so that the parties can re-
construct their lives on a happy and useful 
basis." 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was justified in granting a decree 
of divorce to each party against the other, and made a fair 
and equitable award of the property of the parties, together 
with reasonable provision for the maintenance of the wife 
under the existing circumstances. 
The judgment and decree of the trial court should 
therefore be affirmed. 
C. Gerald Parker 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOH 
Attorneys for Defendant-Responde 
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